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INTRODUCTION 
The latter half of the twentieth century has been a 
time of tremendous change for the Roman Catholic Church in 
America. These changes have produced many disagreements 
between the laity, who no longer feel bound to the Church's 
teaching authority, and the hierarchy, who continue to 
emphasize traditional teachings. The interpretations of 
these disagreements vary from author to author. But they 
can be categorized into two basic interpretations. More 
longstanding popular and academic notions have suggested 
that the majority of the Church's members is in a state of 
tension. In this scenario, differences between the laity 
and the Church's hierarchy have threatened the very 
existence of the Church, with both sides refusing to yield 
in their differing opinions, and the laity threatening 
massive withdrawals if teachings and institutional practices 
do not change. But some writers, such as Greeley (1977), 
Kennedy (1984, 1985), and Greeley and Durkin (1984) question 
this scenario. They claim that tension is minimal, because 
for most of the laity, it simply doesn't exist. The laity 
have become "selective Catholics," 1 who ignore, rather than 
challenge, Church leaders on many matters, but remain loyal 
1I borrow this term from Greeley and Durkin (1984: 3). 
1 
to the institution through their continued participation in 
it locally. The popular wisdom with its dire predictions 
about the laity is, for these writers, simply incorrect. 
2 
The conflict image of the American Catholic Church may 
be lingering from the turbulence of the late 1960s and early 
1970s. As a writer from that time, Osborne (1969) provides 
an opportunity to look back into that time. Religious 
reform, which Osborne claims began long before Vatican II, 
is the arena for change among Catholics. And one of the 
greatest religious reforms involved ignoring official Church 
rules, such as attending Mass weekly; acts which defy the 
very authority of the Church to promulgate and interpret 
"Natural Law." Osborne characterized Catholicism, then, as 
an institution which had "to endure the struggle of a 'house 
divided against itself'" (Osborne, 1969: 50; emphasis 
added). Hoge (1986) represents a contemporary example of 
the church-in-conflict viewpoint. Comparing American 
Catholics to a river and the Roman hierarchy to a flood 
gate, Hoge predicts a future of escalating tensions in the 
U.S. Church. He claims that the hierarchy's failure to 
change those teachings with which the laity disagree will 
result in an explosion of bitter tension between the two. 
Statement of the Problem 
Much has been written about selective catholicism, but 
little from a purely sociological viewpoint. Much of the 
writing has been descriptive in nature and has centered on 
what I call an indicator of selective Catholicism, namely 
the disagreements between the laity and the hierarchy. In 
fact, the focus on this indicator probably has contributed 
to the persistence of conflict models of the Church in 
America. Given this focus, it is hard to break away from 
psychological and social-psychological analyses of this 
phenomenon. The descriptions of selective Catholicism 
below, in fact, frequently rely on such viewpoints. 
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There are few works which ground an analysis of 
selective catholicism in a macrosociological explanation. 
All of the descriptions of selective Catholicism mention the 
institutional detachment which is its root. But for many, 
the social changes responsible for this detachment receive 
secondary treatment, while the thrust of the study concerns 
the latest trends in the indicators: how many Catholics 
practice birth control now as opposed to the early 1970s, 
for example. Conversely, those works which do address 
macrosociological trends, such as secularization theory do 
not relate them specifically to the phenomenon of selective 
Catholicism. 
My goal is to sociologically scrutinize selective 
Catholicism. I will examine in detail the role of cultural, 
socioeconomic/demographic, and institutional changes in its 
development. Thus, I try to explain for American Catholics 
what Luckmann (1967) claimed that most sociology tries to 
explain: the effect of societal forces on the individual. I 
will also reverse the analysis to examine the effects of 
selective catholicism on the Church currently and try to 
project them in the future. 
My review of the socioeconomic/demographic, cultural, 
and institutional changes appears in the third and fourth 
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chapters. Before I move on to that, though, I will examine 
several empirical indicators of selective Catholicism in the 
second chapter. My assessment of the organizational "state 
of the Church" appears in the fifth chapter. Finally in the 
sixth chapter, I offer some suggestions for future research 
which could serve to keep a sociological focus on this 
phenomenon. 
Selective Catholicism Defined 
The selective Catholicism concept asserts that policy 
disagreements among active catholics are not primarily aired 
in the manner of protest and conflictual dissent. Rather, 
Catholics selectively ignore those teachings promulgated by 
the hierarchy with which they disagree, and accept others 
with which they agree. Fichter (1977: 163) states: 
What seems to be happening now is that more and more 
catholics are simply disregarding the official 
pronouncements of the church hierarchy. They are not in 
revolt. They are not openly disrespectful of the 
prelates, but they are simply no longer impressed by the 
need of attending to directives and prohibitions. 
Leege and Gremillion (1986: 4) identified this selective 
Catholicism (without giving a specific label to it) through 
data collected in the Notre Dame study of Catholic Parish 
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Life. 2 They state that active Catholics 
feel comfortable with selecting which of the Church's 
teachings they will espouse and which they will reject. 
In this respect, American Catholics act very much like 
the increasingly well-educated, middle-class Americans 
that they are. They accept human authority less because 
of its traditional nature and more because of its 
appropriate positions. Yet they remain loyal to the 
underlying institution, practice its rites, and continue 
to work for it. 
Kennedy (1984, 1985) contends that writers and 
reporters characterize the Church as in conflict because 
they attribute that which is most visible, namely protest 
and dissent, as normative for most American Catholics. This 
could not be further from the truth, according to Kennedy. 
Rather, dissent among American Catholics and between them 
and Church leaders characterizes the minority, whom he terms 
"First culture Catholics." The growing majority, the 
"Second culture Catholics," while holding the same opinions 
and attitudes as the minority, do not consider themselves 
rebels or dissenters. With the decline of authoritarianism 
in the West, they no longer regard the Church's hierarchical 
authority as legitimate. According to Kennedy (1985: 12): 
Just as most people do not think of every choice as 
another act in a never resolved rebellion against the 
authority of their own parents, so Second culture 
Catholics' do not see their choices as continuing 
episodes of rebellion against the pope, the bishops, or 
2The Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life, which I 
refer to throughout this paper, includes the following 
reports as of March, 1988: Leege and Gremillion (1984, 
1986); Dolan and Leege (1985); Leege and Trozzolo (1985a, 
1985b); Searle and Leege (1985a, 1985b); Leege (1986a, 
1986b, 1987a, 1987b, 1988). A summary of the first ten 
reports was published by Gremillion and Castelli (1987). 
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ecclesiastical authority of any kind. In truth, many of 
them do not think about church leaders much at all. 
Thus the version of Catholicism which characterizes 
catholics as reeling in discontent over such issues as 
priestly celibacy or women priests is inaccurate. Those 
portraits, no matter how visible, spring from the minority 
catholics who are still attached to the institutional 
structure of the Church. For the majority, the vital issues 
of life flow not from the hierarchy, but from their 
understanding of the whole society (Kennedy, 1984). 
Greeley and Durkin (1984: 10-11) propose much the same 
scenario as Kennedy: 
With the decline in importance of institutional 
structures, Catholics increasingly look to their faith 
for comfort and challenge, for inspiration in life and 
consolation in death. Few take seriously anymore the 
Church as a teacher on either moral or social action 
matters. The Church is not for ethics; it is for 
religion. 
There is no reeling discontent. Active American Catholics 
still support and remain loyal to their Church, especially 
their local parishes. But their loyalty is offered on their 
own terms. This usually means they ignore the official 
Church teachers and devote more of their attention to local 
matters than to the affairs of the pope and the bishops, or 
issues such as women's ordination. Greeley and Durkin 
assume this is especially true among Catholics aged twenty 
and younger. 
Greeley (1977: 272) terms this kind of Catholic "the 
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communal catholic. 113 Communal Catholics strongly and 
proudly identify themselves as Catholics, yet ignore the 
pronouncements of the hierarchy. He predicts that "the most 
likely projection for the future [of the American Catholic 
Church] is the emergence of a large group of 'communal 
catholics'" who "refuse to take seriously the teaching 
authority of the institutional Church." Furthermore, 
Greeley (1977) states, those most likely to be communal 
catholics are younger and well-educated. 
As empirical evidence for this prediction, Greeley 
(1977) points to the rejection of the official sexual 
morality but continued support of selected aspects of the 
Church, such as Catholic schools. Thus, the communal 
Catholics may identify themselves as Catholics and remain 
actively involved in many Church activities. But they will 
not be strongly attached to the Church's formal teachings 
nor its teachers. Communal Catholics will strongly identify 
themselves as Catholics, but will select for themselves 
which aspects of Catholicism to accept. 
The above authors state that American catholics do not 
conflict with church hierarchy, but selectively ignore them. 
American lay people are no longer attached to, and thus feel 
no obligation to obey, the Church's teaching authority 
(primarily the Pope and the Roman Curia). They therefore 
3curiously, Greeley (1977) never explains why he uses 
the term "communal" in describing this individualistic type 
of behavior. 
feel no obligation to participate in the Church on anyone's 
but their own terms. Those terms include active 
participation in the local parishes despite their ignoring 
many Church teachings. When Greeley and Durkin (1984: 11) 
state that "the Church is not for ethics; it is for 
religion," they mean that the laity accept it only as an 
arena for religious practice, not as a teacher. 
8 
Not only does this explain a lack of current conflict 
among the laity, it predicts the same for the immediate 
future. Hoge's assertion that possible Vatican-imposed 
restraints on the American Church will result in "increased 
tension" and "polarization and alienation among the laity" 
(Hoge, 1986: 297) does not seem likely in this framework. 
The laity will selectively ignore future actions of the 
hierarchy with which they disagree, just as they do now. 
Why? Because they realize that the hierarchy cannot enforce 
most of their teachings (Greeley and Durkin, 1984), 
particularly moral pronouncements, and they feel no 
obligation to obey anyway. 
The Development of Selective Catholicism 
Selective Catholicism, then, is religious 
individualism. rt departs from the American Catholicism of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when adherence 
to Church teachings was more the norm. 
Like all other social changes, it did not develop in a 
vacuum. It is caused in part by a detachment from the 
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Church's teaching authority, despite regular participation 
in the Church locally. The authors cited above tie it to 
other social changes such as the decline of institutions and 
authoritarianism. I suggest that selective catholicism 
resulted from socioeconomic and demographic changes within 
the Catholic lay population, secularization and the rise of 
"radical individualism" within the larger American society, 
and institutional changes within the Church itself. 
In some ways, these changes affected the development 
of selective Catholicism directly. In other ways, they 
caused detachment from the Church's teaching authority, 
which in turn affected the development of selective 
Catholicism. Put briefly, detachment from the Church's 
teaching authority is an intervening variable between 
social and institutional changes and the development of 
selective catholicism. 
Upward socioeconomic mobility and greater religious 
tolerance, beginning after world War I, allowed American 
Catholics to break away from the protective isolation 
originally afforded by the Church and distance themselves 
from it. Just like with any other social group, as more 
Catholic generations were born in America and enjoyed 
relatively greater affluence, they moved into the mainstream 
American culture. There, the laity were exposed to a 
society in which religion was privatized. As Catholics 
became American and privatized their religion, they began to 
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practice selective catholicism. Religion's role was 
compartmentalized within their social lives. Like most 
other American institutions, it occupied a less central 
position in their social circles. The Church no longer 
occupied a prominent enough position to affect their 
everyday decision making. This lack of attachment prompted 
them to believe in an individualistic, i.e. selective 
manner. Selective Catholicism further developed as 
individualism increasingly pervaded American culture 
beginning in the 1960s. 
These cultural and demographic changes were eventually 
accompanied by institutional changes within the Church. The 
windows opened by the Second Vatican Council may have 
reinforced the developing individualism among the American 
laity, who more and more were becoming like their non-
Catholic neighbors in their appreciation of democratic 
institutions and individual initiative. However, it may 
have been Vatican II which encouraged the laity to 
participate in the Church locally though they were detached 
from the Church's teaching authority. 
INDICATORS OF SELECTIVE CATHOLICISM 
Changing Attitudes 
The literature regarding Catholics' attitudes, 
especially attitudes about sexual morality, is abundant 
indeed. The fact that Catholics disagree with their 
teachers and do things which the hierarchy condemns is 
common knowledge. This knowledge is in fact the basis for 
claims that the laity are in a state of tension and on the 
verge of leaving the Church, if not revolting against it. 
Hoge (1986), for example, would compare the differences of 
opinion to a river and a flood gate, with the hierarchical 
flood gate bursting if it does not yield to the lay pressure 
to change teachings. But an examination of these 
differences of opinion can reveal selective Catholicism. Of 
all the documentation of the laity's differences with the 
hierarchy, Leege and Gremillion (1986) and Gallup and 
Castelli (1987) point out the selective rather than 
oppositional nature of the differences. 
Both Leege and Gremillion (1986) and Gallup and 
Castelli (1987) use attitudes regarding abortion and 
contraception to illustrate the selectiv~ nature in which 
Catholics form their opinions. Both the Notre Dame data 
collected from active parishioner and Gallup poll data 
collected from the general population showed that Catholics 
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generally disagree with the Church's ban on contraceptives, 
but generally agree on its condemnation of abortion. For 
example, Leege and Gremillion (1986: 4) asked parishioners 
their level of agreement to the following statements: "The 
Church should remain strong in its opposition to the use of 
contraceptives;" and "The Church should remain strong in its 
opposition to abortion." Possible responses ranged from 1 
to 4, with 4 meaning strong agreement. The mean score on 
the first question.was 2.23, showing disapproval of the 
Church's opposition to contraception. The mean score on the 
second was 3.35, showing a fairly strong approval of the 
Church's opposition to abortion. It was this trend which 
led Leege and Gremillion to conclude that catholics do not 
disagree with the hierarchy for the sake of disagreeing. 
They also believe Catholics are not content to accept 
teachings on the basis of tradition alone. The active 
Catholics in their sample listen to and consider the moral 
teaching of the Church, "but ... in the end will consult 
their conscience and experience in deciding whether to 
accept or reject it" (Leege and Gremillion, 1986: 7). 
Gallup and Castelli (1987) point out the same 
relationship between abortion and contraception attitudes 
among Catholics in the general population. They state that 
American Catholics "accept church teachings only when it 
makes sense in terms of their own consciences" (Gallup and 
Castelli, 1987: 183). Thus they found that Catholics 
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disagree with the Church on teachings related to sexual 
morality, but tend to agree on "life issues" such as 
abortion. Catholics, however, do not only disagree with the 
conservative teachings. Several moderate and liberal 
bishops have proposed a "seamless garment" social philosophy 
whereby "life issues" should be linked together and 
approached by a common philosophy: e.g. opposition to 
abortion, the arms race, socioeconomic inequalities, 
abortion, and capital punishment. But Gallup polls show 
that catholics overwhelmingly support the death penalty 
(Gallup and Castelli, 1987). And the Notre Dame study 
discovered that most active Catholics do not consider 
attitudes about nuclear disarmament "a valid test of whether 
or not one is a true Catholic" (Leege, 1988: 4). 4 A 
"seamless garment" approach is not likely to be very popular 
since poll data reveal catholics as relying on their own 
individual judgment to construct their beliefs. Unlike the 
bishops, the laity tend not to adopt unifying principles, 
but apply principles (such as the "life principles") to 
certain situations as they see fit (Leege, 1988). 
Mass Attendance 
Osborne (1969) used attendance figures to demonstrate 
the turbulence in the U.S. Catholic Church in the late 1960s 
4rn fact, Leege (1988) reveals, a 1987 Gallup-National 
Catholic Reporter poll discovered that only one-third of 
those who identified themselves as catholic had heard of the 
American bishops' pastoral letter on nuclear arms. 
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and continuing through the early 1970s. But Mass attendance 
figures which once revealed a Church in crisis in the 1960s 
and 1970s today can demonstrate the emergence of selective 
catholicism. Osborne (1969: 44) claimed that: 
Mass attendance as a norm and behavior pattern is one 
thing. But the Mass is also the central ritual of 
Catholicism, if not its most distinguishing feature. It 
is probably no exaggeration to say that with respect to 
the future of Catholicism "as the Mass goes, so goes the 
Church." Boas, Malinowski, and a host of other 
scientific students of religion assert the primacy of 
ritual. Anthony Wallace, an anthropologist from the 
University of Pennsylvania, makes the point quite 
clearly when he says, "Ritual is religion in action; it 
is the cutting edge of the tool ... it is ritual which 
accomplishes what religion sets out to do." What occurs 
in or around the Mass, therefore, carries far more 
import for the future of the Catholic religion than what 
happens to parochial schools or to the chancery. 
Catholic schools and the chancery are not where "the 
action is." 
Likewise, Gallup and Castelli (1987: 26) hold that "Mass 
attendance is ... important because it serves as a barometer 
of more general belief and practice." They furthermore 
interpret opinion data to conclude that Catholics feel more 
strongly than most Protestants that weekly religious 
services are important. The weekly Mass is the focal point 
of Catholic activity for the Church. It is the one catholic 
activity that all catholics share. If, then, Mass 
attendance can gauge "the state of the laity," I believe it 
points toward the rise of selective Catholicism in the 
1980s. 
In 1969, traditional Mass attendance was dropping and 
showed no indication of increasing again, especially among 
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the young. Although types of "underground Mass" (Osborne 
1969: 45) and Masses held by cult-like fellowship 
organizations were gaining in appeal, Mass attendance was 
dropping on the whole. Thus Osborne, and no doubt many 
writers of the time, were moved to label Catholicism as a 
Church in crisis. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many, 
especially young and educated, Catholics aired their 
disagreements with the hierarchy by withdrawing their 
attendance (Roof and McKinney, 1987). In 1963, for example, 
71 percent of the Catholic respondents to a National Opinion 
Research Center survey stated that they attended Mass 
weekly. By 1974, that percentage had dropped to 50 percent 
(Greeley, 1977; Greeley, Mccready and Mccourt, 1976). 
Gallup polls showed that the decline was strongest between 
1968 and 1978, when the total percentage of catholics 
attending weekly Mass dropped from 65 to 52 percent (Gallup 
and Castelli, 1987). 
But currently, attendance figures have stabilized 
(Gallup and Castelli, 1987; Gallup and Poling, 1980), with 
the proportion of Catholics attending weekly Mass remaining 
at 51 percent in 1987 (Gallup and Castelli, 1987). Also, 
Mass attendance among younger adult Catholics (ages 18-30) 
has increased in the past ten years, and now attendance is 
positively correlated with higher education, 5 according to 
5Albrecht and Heaton (1984) discovered positive 
relationships between education and church attendance within 
several religious denominations. This was despite a general 
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NORC and Gallup surveys (Gallup and Castelli, 1987; Leege 
and Trozzolo, 1985a). Life-cycle changes can partially · 
explain the change, as "baby boom" Catholics in their late 
20s and early 30s have children and return to Church (Gallup 
and Castelli, 1987). However, it also implies that "if 
there is a policy discontent among educated young Catholics 
[who still participate in the Church] ... it is manifested in 
a different way than in failure to participate in Mass" 
(Leege and Trozzolo, 1985a: 5). 
If Osborne's (1969) statement about the centrality of 
ritual in religion is valid, then the changes in American 
Catholics' attendance since the mid-1970s signals a change 
in American Catholicism from a "Church in conflict." 
"Policy discontent" is not manifested in absences or 
protests. American Catholics, despite their relatively 
strong attendance figures, hold much the same attitudes they 
did in the early 1970s. But the years of the dramatic drops 
in attendance have been over for some time. Instead of 
leaving the Church, they have become selective Catholics. 
Privatized Religion 
Despite steady Mass attendance trends since the late 
1970s, the Church has not regained its status in the lives 
of American Catholics from the days of the immigrant Church, 
before World War I. The recent Notre Dame study of catholic 
negative relationship in the national population. 
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parishes empirically investigated the role the Church plays 
in active American catholics' lives. Analyses of the Notre 
Dame data have confirmed the existence of the privatized 
religion which generates selective Catholicism among 
American Catholics. 
Leege and Gremillion (1984) found evidence of the 
Church's privatized role in the lives of its members. On 
the one hand, they discovered that fully 85 percent of 
Catholic parishioners feel the Church meets their spiritual 
needs. Almost half are actively involved in activities and 
organizations beyond weekly religious ceremonies. Yet, on 
the other hand, they state "whether contemporary American 
parishes are meaningful social communities is another 
matter" (Leege and Gremillion 1984: 6). Seventy-five 
percent of their sample indicated that leaving their parish 
would not upset them very much. And 45 percent reported 
that their parish did not meet their "social needs." In 
brief, Catholics regard their parishes positively as 
religious institutions. However they do not seem to rate 
their parishes as important socially. Here is an example of 
the Church's playing a limited role within Catholics' lives. 
Within the sphere of religion, it is warmly regarded. But 
outside of that sphere, it has little influence because it 
isn't considered important. 
Leege and Trozzolo (1985b) discovered further evidence 
of the Church's limited influence through parishioners' 
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views of the purpose of their parish. "Even though 
parishioners used communitarian language to define the 
parish, they use quite self-centered language when asked 
about the fundamental problems of human existence and how 
they are overcome" (Leege and Trozzolo 1985b: 8). Many 
catholics in their sample defined their parishes as 
communities or fellowships. Most, then, probably 
intellectually accept the Vatican II characterization of the 
Church as "the people of God." Yet when asked to describe 
what they considered "the fundamental problem of human 
existence," many resorted to individualistic concepts. 
Despite voicing communal ideals for their local parishes, 
many Catholics characterize their deepest concerns as 
individualistic in nature. This is significant, for Leege 
and Trozzolo believe these operative beliefs may shape a 
parish more than the intellectual characterizations which 
the parishioners hold. Thus parishioners may shape their 
parish into a collectivity of individuals pursuing 
individual needs. More importantly, these beliefs may 
indicate that Catholics do not feel the Church addresses 
what they consider "the fundamental problem of human 
existence." If this is the case, the Church can have 
nothing but limited influence in its members' lives. The 
laity will not look toward it to shape their behavior if it 
addresses non-fundamental life issues. 
In yet another analysis, Leege (1986) reveals that 
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institutional detachment may be most prevalent among the 
young and educated. Catholics who attend Church regularly 
feel it is a good and proper place to address needs varying 
from: traditional religious needs, such as religious 
education for children; normally stressful needs, such as 
family difficulties; and extremely stressful needs, such as 
unemployment. Many felt that they could bring these needs 
to their parish and receive help. And many more said they 
would do so if help were available. But this is not a 
uniform trend. Younger, more educated, and higher income 
catholics are more likely than older, less educated, and 
lower income Catholics to turn elsewhere to meet their 
needs, such as professional counselors. Leege (1986: 6) 
concludes that "younger Catholics of higher educational and 
income attainments, who are currently raising their 
families, have moved away from the parish and its staff as a 
central point of orientation for many life problems." And, 
Leege found, even if help in many of these services were 
available at churches where they aren't currently, the 
younger, more educated Catholics would nonetheless search 
for them elsewhere. Leege has confirmed that institutional 
detachment is more prevalent among young, well educated, and 
higher income lay persons as other writers (Greeley and 
Durkin, 1984; Greeley, 1977) have speculated. 
The most recently released findings of the study show 
that American catholics accept the hierarchy's authority to 
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speak on various issues to the degree those issues affect 
their personal lives (Leege, 1987b; Gremillion and Castelli, 
1987). When the issue is international poverty, for 
example, the laity feel it most proper for the hierarchy to 
speak out, as this issue does not personally affect them 
much. At the other extreme, however, the laity feels it is 
least proper for the hierarchy to speak out about subjects 
much closer to themselves, e.g. birth control. Thus, 
Catholics may reject Church authority when the proclaimed 
norm treads on areas they regard as personal freedoms. 6 
However, granting legitimacy to the hierarchy's teaching on 
national and international issues does not translate into 
the laity's acceptance of it. As Leege (1987b: 12) states, 
the hierarchy's pronouncements become merely one element in 
the individual's "calculus" of her moral attitudes. The 
Church's teaching authority plays a limited role in the 
individual's outlook. 
In summary, the Notre Dame researchers have found that 
the catholic Church, as an institution, does not currently 
play a central moral role in the lives of its active 
members. Therefore, it is safe to say that American 
Catholics in general are not strongly attached to the 
6unfortunately, it seems that the Notre Dame study used 
only birth control to test the laity's acceptance of the 
hierarchy's teaching on individual behavior. Lay catholics' 
attitudes about the Church's role in birth control are well 
known. Another variable, such as legitimacy of Church 
teaching on charitable contributions, might have shed more 
light on this issue. 
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institutional Church. The Notre Dame researchers have 
demonstrated the lack of institutional attachment which lies 
at the heart of the selective Catholicism thesis. 
Finally, in a separate study, Gallup and Castelli 
(1987) highlight institutional detachment through catholic 
women's opinions about the way the Church treats them. They 
state that 
... it would be difficult to look at these data and 
conclude that Catholic women as a group are angry. The 
data suggest that many women who believe the Church does· 
not respond well to women in general are more satisfied 
with the way their own parish treats them - women are 
three times as likely to give the Church a "poor" rating 
for its handling of women in general as for the way it 
meets their own needs. Put another way, women who feel 
dissatisfied with the Church's treatment of them as 
women are more satisfied with the Church's treatment of 
them as persons (Gallup and Castelli, 1987: 46-47). 
Gallup and Castelli have found that women believe the Church 
treats them poorly, but are not overly concerned about it. 7 
It does not seem to touch them personally, although they are 
aware that what many consider mistreatment by Church 
authorities exists. It may not affect them because their 
particular ox is not being gored, but also because they are 
not attached strongly enough to the institution to feel it. 
7Gallup and Castelli make this assertion based on 
national Gallup poll data. Their sample.includes both 
religiously active Catholics and inactive Catholic women, as 
well as women of all ages. Thus it is conceivable that 
older women's acceptance of traditional female roles in the 
Church might dilute younger women's rejection of them in the 
aggregate survey results. Although the authors' conclusion 
makes sense within the context of American society's 
privatizing of religion, the potential impact of this 
question makes it a compelling subject for future study. 
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If a woman's activity in the Church is limited to building 
her individual religious faith and the Church does not play 
an active role in her life, then the actions of the 
hierarchy, for better or worse, probably won't be of much 
concern. 
THE EFFECTS OF ASSIMILATION, PRIVATIZATION, 
AND RADICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
Having demonstrated the existence of selective 
catholicism and privatization of American Catholics' 
religion, I now attempt to explain how each developed, and 
just as importantly, how the latter led to the former. 
After World War I, and especially after the 1940s, change 
became the dominant force for the Church. American 
catholics experienced upward socioeconomic mobility and as 
they became better educated and moved to the suburbs. These 
trends led to what many called the "Americanization" of the 
catholic Church. Catholics began to appear in all strata of 
American society and resemble other Americans in religious 
behavior as well as affluence. As they "became American," 
their religion was privatized. Sociological theorists have 
explained that privatizing religion leads to a selective 
style of believing because it cannot offer an all-
encompassing system of belief. 
Americanization was only the first step toward the 
development of selective Catholicism. After this trend 
began, major shifts in the dominant culture occurred. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new and intense emphasis 
on individualism further inspired American church members to 
selectively believe. This change enhanced the trend of 
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individuals' building their own private faiths. 
Socioeconomic Changes: Assimilation and Privatization 
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Catholicism 
offered immigrant catholic generations protection from a 
hostile new society. The prominence of the Church in 
people's lives during the first half of the twentieth 
century derived from this defensive nature (Kennedy, 1984). 
"In the immigrant neighborhoods the parish was a central 
community institution. Most often organized according to 
language or nationality, it gave the newcomers a source of 
identity in a strange new world" (Dolan and Leege 1985: 2). 
Additionally, the Church's stress on individual salvation as 
the central focus of human life provided consolation, as 
well as protection, in the face of difficulty. Catholics 
found unemployment, poverty, and prejudice easier to 
tolerate because of the Church's constant assurance of 
eternal salvation (Osborne, 1969). The Church, then, played 
a central role in its members' lives. 
I believe it is important not to romanticize the 
behavior of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American 
Catholics. It is overly simplistic to characterize them as 
unquestioningly obedient and intellectually passive to Rome. 
American Catholics' advocacy for a more democratic and 
pragmatic approach to Church issues received stern 
opposition from the Vatican at the turn of the century 
(Hoge, 1986; Hennesey, 1981). Nonetheless, educational and 
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socioeconomic levels were low, and it is safe to say that 
while they were not a perfectly homogeneous population, 
catholics' disagreements with the hierarchy were much fewer 
than they were to be later this century. 
Socioeconomic and demographic changes occurred most 
rapidly for Catholics, as for all Americans, after World War 
II. The post-war boom had an especially strong effect on 
the American Catholic Church. European immigration to the 
U.S. already had been slowed for many years: larger 
proportions of the Catholic population were native-born. 
Catholics began to move to the suburbs and their children 
attained more education. American Catholics began to 
resemble the American mainstream. 
According to Gleason (1969), this occurred not only in 
terms of socioeconomic status but also mainstream attitudes 
and beliefs. American Catholics, he felt, were losing their 
explicit and well defined self-consciousness. The process 
of Americanization, or acculturation, eliminated any need 
for protection from American society, since American 
Catholics were becoming a part of it. When this need 
diminished, so did the role of the Church in the lives of 
its members (Kim, 1980). Gleason (1969: 11) stated: 
The generation now entering society as young adults 
hardly even remembers the period of "Protestant-catholic 
tensions" in the early 1950's - to say nothing of the Ku 
Klux Klan of Al Smith days - but it does remember that 
John F. Kennedy was a catholic who became President of 
the United States. Hence, these young people have 
little reason to think of themselves as a minority 
threatened by the society around them, but good reason 
to believe that they are pretty much the same kind of 
Americans as everyone else. It is not surprising that 
they seem to wonder why older Catholics thought · 
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otherwise, that they question the need for separate 
Catholic schools or societies, or that they ask why 
Catholics should have different views from other men of 
good will on such matters as divorce or abortion. 
After World war II, then, the parish began to lose its 
relevance as a source to solve their problems. Higher 
education and suburban living, with its more individualistic 
lifestyles than those of the urban immigrant neighborhoods, 
exposed Catholic children to a more secular world than their· 
parents had known (Dolan and Leege, 1985). "At best, the 
parish was a source of indirect help" (Leege, 1986: 6). 
Upward mobility, suburbanization, and education broke the 
bonds between the catholic institution and its members and 
encouraged them to seek other answers to religious 
questions. 
Secularized Society8 
In order to understand American Catholics after they 
assimilated, it is necessary to understand the religious 
behavior of the dominant society to which they joined. As 
mainstream Americans, Catholics' behavior would be 
influenced by the same social forces and events as other 
Americans. This is especially evident in light of the fact 
that many of the mainstream Protestant churches were 
Br prefer the term "secularized" to "secular," as the 
latter is often used in a negative, emotionally loaded 
manner (Wilson, 1979; 1985). 
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experiencing the same phenomena as the catholics (drops in 
attendance and selective believing). Thus, much of the 
causes of selective Catholicism can be attributed to general 
cultural influences, since other churches were similarly 
affected (Roof and McKinney, 1987). 
What kind of religious environment was awaiting 
Catholics when they assimilated? The culture which 
educated, suburban Catholics confronted was secularized. 
Religion had been relegated to the "private sphere" with 
very little influence over public life. 
Individuals' detachment from religious institutions 
occurred because religion was declining as a social force, 
according to secularization theory. Secularization theory 
proposes a 
decline in the significance of religion in the operation 
of the social system, its diminished significance in 
social consciousness, and its reduced command over the 
resources (time, energy, skill, intellect, imagination, 
and accumulated wealth) of mankind (Wilson, 1985: 14). 
In modern society, science, rationalization, and secular law 
have subsumed many of religion's traditional functions. 
The body of secularization theory is immense, 9 and 
contains many different versions of the relationship between 
religion and modern society. There are, however, several 
dominant theoretical themes which run throughout the 
9In fact, according to Wilson (1985), the discipline of 
sociology was originally founded to explain the decline of 
religion and the rise of rationalism in modern Western 
society. 
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literature (Shiner, 1967). One theme is society's 
withdrawal from religion's influence, whether that results 
from outright rejection of religious symbols and 
understandings, or an attempt by society to reformulate the 
understanding of society as a human construction apart from 
the divine. The former explanation is often accompanied, 
according to Shiner (1967), by the prediction of a totally 
non-religious society. The latter explanation predicts the 
survival of religion, but restricted to private life. 
Another dominant theme explains the decline of religion's 
influence through a "desacralization of the world" (Shiner, 
1967: 215), as sacred explanations no longer suffice to 
explain the universe in light of natural and social science. 
Still another theme emphasizes a growth of attention to the 
human rather than the supernatural world. Finally, another 
version proposes that "knowledge, patterns of behavior, and 
institutional arrangements which were once understood as 
grounded in divine power are transformed into phenomena of 
purely human creation and responsibility" (Shiner, 1967: 
214). 
These themes are complementary and each probably 
explains a part of the whole phenomenon of secularization. 
But the one which is particularly pertinent in discussing 
American catholics' selective style of believing is 
privatization: society's relegation of religion to the 
sphere of private life. In modern Western society religion 
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exists in a self-contained sphere, having only tenuous 
connections with it. For Berger (1969), religion is present 
in the most public and the most private spheres of society, 
but nowhere else. 
Religion manifests itself as public rhetoric and private 
virtue. In other words, insofar as religion is common, 
it lacks "reality," and insofar as it is real it lacks 
commonality. This situation represents a severe rupture 
of the traditional task of religion, which was precisely 
the establishment of an integrated set of definitions of 
reality that could serve as a common universe of meaning 
for the members of a society (Berger, 1969: 134). 
This privatization, or relegation of religion to the private 
sphere, occurred as various institutions in the west came to 
specialize in specific segments of the society, e.g. 
economics, law, medicine, etc. (Luckmann, 1967). Religion 
became mere public rhetoric as this "institutional 
specialization" (Luckmann, 1967: 39) made one encompassing 
system of meaning impractical for both the society and the 
individual. "Even for those who continue to be socialized 
into [a religion], specifically religious representations 
tend to have a predominately rhetorical status" (Luckmann, 
1967: 99-100). Modern society's institutional 
specialization relativizes religious content. 
Privatization of religion causes selective Catholicism 
because, when the "reality" of religion exists only in the 
private sphere, it develops many of the characteristics of 
the market (Berger, 1969; Luckmann, 1967). No longer having 
influence over the total society or being able exclusively 
to provide a system of ultimate meaning, religion must 
compete with other spheres to establish its definitions of 
reality. Individuals likewise become religious consumers. 
"This is the crucial sociological and social-psychological 
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characteristics of the pluralistic situation" (Berger, 1969: 
145). As consumers, religious believers' tastes will 
change. They will choose religions which meet their latest 
desires. 
This consumerist behavior, coupled with the difficulty 
which institutional specialization poses for a system of 
ultimate meaning, leads to selective believing. Luckmann 
(1967: 102) states that 
The assortment of religious representations - a sacred 
cosmos in a loose sense of the term only - is not 
internalized by any potential consumer as a whole. The 
"autonomous" consumer selects, instead, certain 
religious themes from the available assortment and 
builds them into a somewhat precarious private system of 
"ultimate" significance. Individual religiosity is thus 
no longer a replica or approximation of an "official" 
model. 
Secularization theory, especially privatization 
theory, then, can address the selective tendencies of 
American Catholics. Religion has little influence over the 
rest of society if it is relegated to the private sphere. 
Nor can it dictate the behavior of individuals. This is the 
social environment American Catholics moved into when they 
broke the bonds with the immigrant cultures. They had 
already weakened their attachment to the Church by 
withdrawing from the immigrant culture. The society into 
which they moved facilitated a weak role for, and 
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consequently weak attachment to, religion. 
Cultural Changes: The Rise of Individualism 
What kind of environment did Catholics experience 
afterward? The latter half of the twentieth century was a 
time of tremendous cultural change for American society at 
large. The late 1960s and the 1970s experienced a cultural 
change to a radical type of individualism. For the 
mainstream religious community, the new individualism meant 
a decline in membership as individuals sought to establish 
their own personal religions (Roof and McKinney, 1987). rt 
also reinforced selective behavior among those who remained 
members of mainstream churches. 
Bellah, et al.: "Sheilaism" 
Bellah and his colleagues (Bellah, et al., 1985), 
document a new, stronger cultural emphasis on the individual 
self in American society than the individualism inherent in 
privatized religion. This new individualism appeared during 
the late 1960s and 1970s, the tail end of Catholic 
assimilation. It represented another social condition in 
addition to the privatized religion, in which American 
Catholics found themselves shortly after leaving the 
immigrant Church. 
Bellah, et al. (1985) speak of "the therapeutic 
attitude" dominating American culture and especially 
prominent in the thinking and behavior of middle-class 
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Americans. This attitude emphasizes self-realization over 
interpersonal and societal commitment. The individual owes 
nothing to another person or organization unless she 
receives subjective satisfaction from them. Relationships 
are governed by one social mos: individuals must protect 
their self-interests by communicating their feelings and 
assessments of the other. Permanence in relationships and 
commitments cannot "be grounded in something larger than the 
satisfactions provided by the relationship itself" (Bellah, 
et al., 1985: 107). In brief, relationships are fragile; 
"attachment" is not valued for itself or social 
prescriptions requiring it, but for the personal fulfillment 
it might bring. 
The authors point to two social consequences of the 
therapeutic attitude which apply to religion. First, what 
might be termed a macrosociological effect, is a tendency to 
maintain the social-structural status quo. The focus for 
all change rests almost exclusively on the individual. 
Change occurs in individuals within the structures of 
society, but without actually affecting them. Church 
members, their attention focused on their "inner selves," 
seek to transform themselves independently of transforming 
their church. This is precisely the result of selective 
Catholicism, as lay Catholics concentrate on maintaining 
their personal faiths and ignore Church structure. If the 
formal Church structure is to change, it will have to be 
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changed by the hierarchy. 
Placing the emphasis for change on the individual 
partially gives rise to the second consequence of the 
therapeutic attitude in religion: the development of 
private religions. The other contributor is American 
history. Bellah, et al., like secularization theorists, 
describe the history of American religion as a history of 
privatization. Slowly, the degree of religious influence 
began to shrink during the nineteenth century. The moral 
consensus and harmony which religion sought to bestow on 
colonial America became limited to a sphere unto itself. 
Religion became a haven within a heartless world. The 
transformation of privatized religion to private religion 
began with American individualism, especially that found 
among the evangelical sects, but received its fullest 
expression with the advent of the therapeutic attitude. 
Present day Americans pride themselves on forming their own 
religious beliefs apart from the teachings of any organized 
church. For Bellah, et al. (1985: 221), "this suggests the 
possibility of over 220 million American religions." Thus, 
they describe the individualistic religious practices of a 
subject named Sheila as "Sheilaism." 
Roof and McKinney: A Synthesis 
Roof and McKinney (1987) synthesize the concepts of 
religion's declining sphere of influence with the 
development of a new culture of individualism in a detailed 
34 
historical account. They explain that private religiosity 
is a characteristic shared by members of all American 
mainstream religions. It developed as the role of religion 
in American culture changed during the twentieth century. 
The authors posit a declining influence of a common, 
religiously based American outlook. As dominant religious 
ideas and social realities diverged in the 1960s, the link 
between religion and culture broke. By then religion could 
no longer explain tpe events of the day nor forge a national 
moral consensus. Mainstream religions' inability to forge 
national consensus eventually resulted in their inability to 
forge consensus within the churches. 
Up to the early twentieth century, the Protestantism 
of white Anglo-Saxons was the only legitimate American 
religion. And it dictated much of the substance of American 
culture. The immigrants' religions, especially Catholicism 
and Judaism, were deviant and membership was considered 
unpatriotic. During the 1920s and 1930s, Americans began to 
tolerate the non-WASP religions, and religious pluralism 
pervaded. But the link of religion and culture did not 
dissolve with the advent of pluralism. The exclusivist 
tendencies of Protestantism, catholicism, and Judaism were 
downplayed in favor of a national "civic piety," which 
stressed the "more inclusive, more universal elements of 
national faith" (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 36). It was a 
"broadly based moral consensus" on such matters as 
"premarital chastity, marital fidelity, the undesirability 
of divorce, and traditional understandings of family life 
and gender roles" (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 37). It also 
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included common ideals for the nation and American citizens, 
including "patriotism, conformity, capitalism, hard work, 
success, [and] familism" (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 28). 
This civic piety was largely influenced by the Puritanical 
Protestant attitudes which had previously dominated American 
culture, but was widely espoused across denominational 
lines. 10 
The new link between religion and culture was 
inherently fragile in an increasingly complex society. In 
order to have meaning for members of various faiths, the 
civic piety lacked explicitly religious substance, and 
conveyed more secular attitudes. Modern capitalism, in the 
meantime, produced larger, more bureaucratic, and more 
numerous institutions which dominated public life. In the 
face of these social forces, 
the very notion of a mainstream set of values had become 
problematic. With greater institutional differentiation 
and societal complexity, the churches came to have 
little persuasive power over the bureaucratic giants. 
Increasingly the public sector was governed by a largely 
unrestricted interplay of economic forces, which seemed 
impervious to individual religious and altruistic 
motives. Indeed, in a world of huge economic 
conglomerates and multinational corporations, it 
lOThe rise of religious pluralism itself had an effect 
on American Catholics, according to Roof and McKinney 
(1987). I deal with this aspect of the American Catholic 
experience below in the discussion of the institutional 
changes within the church. 
36 
appeared unlikely that religion could sustain any deep 
consensus of faith and values (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 
2 9) • 
The civic piety, however delicate, survived through the 
1950s because of other prevailing social situations. Post-
war affluence endorsed the optimism shared across the 
denominations. Furthermore, the Cold War validated a need 
for shared definitions of patriotism and national consensus. 
Mainstream churches, the channels of the shared national 
"faith," thrived. 
The bond between religion and culture broke in the 
1960s and 1970s when social events contradicted the 
religious context. Reasons for optimism and national 
consensus disappeared with the Vietnam war, urban rioting, 
and poverty's stubborn prevalence despite massive welfare 
efforts. Americans, already facing an economically complex 
society, were confronted with contradiction. America had 
serious problems and the traditional national faith seemed 
unable to respond. The Watergate scandal was the final 
"precipitating event" to break the influence of the civic 
piety. "By that time the old civil faith embodying national 
ideals and messianic conceptions of America as an instrument 
of divine purpose had lost much of its force" (Roof and 
McKinney, 1987: 28). Not only were the problems too complex, 
they defied the shared definitions of society. 
The disconnection of religion and culture led to 
another dominant twentieth-century characteristic, 
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individualism. Without shared ideals, the individual must 
search for ideals and meaning himself. Roof and McKinney 
describe individuals' search for meaning as a "quest" for 
self-fulfillment. And the affluence of the 1960s and early 
1970s allowed Americans to pursue their quest with great 
intensity. Subsistence was not a problem for most people. 
These individualistic quests for meaning touched religious 
organizations. As common ideals declined so did the ability 
of mainstream religions, a source of those values, to 
reforge them. Believers emphasized the primacy of the self 
over institutions and socially ascribed statuses. This 
"reinforced the view that religious institutions should 
serve individuals and not vice-versa" (Roof and McKinney, 
1987: 50). It also reinforced the cultural attitude of 
voluntarism, that a person adhere to a particular belief 
because by choice, and not because of family or ethnic group 
background. In short, after the 1960s and 1970s: 
Americans generally hold a respectful attitude toward 
religion, but also they increasingly regard it as a 
matter of personal choice or preference. Today choice 
means more than simply having an option among religious 
alternatives; it involves religion as an option itself 
and opportunity to draw selectively off a variety of 
traditions in the pursuit of the self ... Questions of 
authority, discipline, practice, and common life often 
seem foreign, or at least secondary (Roof and McKinney, 
1987: 40). 
By 1978, Gallup polls showed that 81 percent of Americans 
agreed that an individual should "arrive at his or her own 
religious beliefs independent of a church or synagogue." 
That percentage broke down into 71 percent of church members 
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and 86 percent of non-members (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 57). 
Conclusion 
During the twentieth century, American Catholics grew 
apart from the immigrant cultures which centered around the 
Church. Their socioeconomic and social-psychological needs 
for attachment to the Church diminished. They now belonged 
to secularized mainstream society which itself had 
privatized religion. In this environment, the force of 
religion had diminished to rhetoric. American Catholics 
became like other mainstream American believers: "religious 
consumers," picking and choosing, according to their own 
criteria, among the items they liked. This tendency was all 
the more exacerbated when American culture spawned a radical 
individualism in the 1960s and 1970s which asserted the 
primacy of individual judgment over institutional 
prescriptions. 
This chapter dealt with the social sources of 
selective catholicism. But the assimilation of American 
Catholics into the mainstream, secularized society explains 
only part of the phenomenon, namely the rise of "pick and 
choose" believing. These changes do not explain how the 
hierarchical, authoritarian Church permit~ catholics who so 
behave to remain active members. Thus the focus of this 
review must turn from the society to the religious 
organization itself. 
The next two chapters discuss both how the Church came 
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to accommodate selective Catholicism, and how institutional 
changes imposed by American society and from within the 
organization actually encouraged selective Catholicism's 
development. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: VOLUNTARIZATION 
FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 
Up to now I have spoken primarily of the collectivity 
of the laity. But the catholic Church also represents a 
highly structured bureaucracy with officers (the hierarchy) 
serving as its leaders. The existence of this aspect of the 
Church, which I've referred to as the "institutional 
Church," is difficult to overlook. The Roman Catholic 
Church is an institutional, financial, and political 
reality. The Pope and the Roman Curia promulgate official 
dogmatic and moral teachings. The American bishops draft 
position statements on nuclear war and the economy in the 
name of the American Church. Nonetheless, when discussing 
the detached state of the laity, the possibility of 
overlooking the institution increases. Since the laity are 
ignoring the hierarchy, the temptation exists for the 
analyst to do so. One must remember that no matter how 
detached the laity may be, the institution is a social 
reality. Thus, there must have been changes in the 
institution which permitted the practice of selective 
Catholicism. 
The catholic institution has been as subject to change 
in the twentieth century as individual American catholics. 
This has occurred both in the ways in which American society 
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defined the Church and in the ways the Church defined 
itself. The former occurred early in the twentieth century 
when the dominant society stopped treating the Catholic 
Church as deviant. American society bestowed upon the 
Church equal status with mainstream Protestantism and with 
Judaism. In the eyes of American society, the Church could 
legitimately claim to be the Church no longer. It was one 
among equals (Roof and McKinney, 1987). The latter change 
occurred in the 1960s when the Church turned its attention 
upon itself during the Second Vatican Council. The Council 
officially endorsed the equality of the laity while 
reinforcing the hierarchical status quo. 
These changes occurred simultaneously with the 
weakening of individuals' attachment and ascriptive ties to 
the Church. They represented an organizational change from 
a total to a voluntary organization. Thus, just when 
various social changes influenced American catholics to 
attribute their Church membership to individual choice 
rather than ascriptive ties (Roof and McKinney, 1987), the 
Church itself became a voluntary organization. The first 
change, bestowed by the American society, externally 
voluntarized catholicism for those who moved away from the 
immigrant communities in the first third of the century. 
They could approach Catholicism as one choice among many. 
The second change, Vatican II, did not in itself voluntarize 
the institution. It was, rather, the laity's selective 
interpretation of new definitions of their role in the 
Church which internally voluntarized the Church for the 
laity, if not in the eyes of the hierarchy. After Vatican 
II, American lay people felt that they could legitimately 
practice "pick and choose" believing within the Catholic 
Church. 
"Denominationalization" 
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Economic and demographic changes during the twentieth 
century assimilated Catholic lay people to American society. 
At the same time, the developing tolerance of religious 
pluralism assimilated the catholic institution. As noted 
above, the religious, if not the cultural, hegemony of 
white, Anglo-Saxon Protestantism gave way to tolerance of 
Catholicism, Judaism, and other mainstream Protestant faiths 
in the 1920s and 1930s. The observance of "E Pluribus Unum" 
stretched to include different religions (Roof and McKinney, 
1987) 11 . 
Tolerance of several religions requires not only 
mutual respect but accommodation. Many Americans therefore 
downplayed the exclusivist teachings of their respective 
11Hennesey (1981: 235) describes the high rate of 
participation by American Catholics in World War I (about 
one million of the over 4.9 million soldiers) as "their 
first extended experience of inter-religious cooperation." 
catholics' participation in the war may have played a role 
in Protestants' acceptance of them. In addition, the 
federal limits on immigration speeded acceptance of 
Catholics. Distrust of immigrants had often caused tension 
between catholics and Protestants (Hudson, 1981). 
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religions. As a condition for their acceptance, American 
religions had "to accept coexistence with others and ... glve 
up claims of authority over them" (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 
34). 12 The newly legitimized faiths lost their status as 
"religions" and were "denominationalized" (Roof and 
McKinney, 1987: 34). Eventually they were accepted 
equally. 13 Belonging to one was, apart from socioeconomic 
and ethnic differences, much the same as belonging to 
another. The Catholic hierarchy may have continued to 
assert its claims to exclusive truth, but such assertions 
were perceived as unrealistic by the Americanized laity. 
Thus the hierarchy and the laity defined the Church 
differently. 
Vatican II 
These differences in definitions of the Church would 
continue even after an ecumenical council. In the midst of 
the socioeconomic, demographic, and cultural changes, the 
global Church's hierarchy subjected the institution to 
intense scrutiny and change. The Second Vatican Council 
12This of course applied to those religions seeking 
equality as a mainstream religion. Religious sects and 
ethnic religious groups would not have downplayed 
exclusivist teachings because they did not wish to be 
accepted by the dominant culture (Finke, 1988). Thus, some 
ethnic parishes may not have been "denominationalized." 
13Although tolerance of Catholicism may have begun in 
the 1920s and 1930s, much overt anti-Catholic prejudice 
persisted through the 1950s to the election of a Catholic 
President. 
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reformed the liturgy, renamed some of the sacraments to 
emphasize different theological aspects, and changed the way 
people looked at the Church. It emphasized ecumenism for 
the first time, thus perhaps internally legitimizing, or at 
least accepting, the Church's equality with other religions. 
Practices in effect for a millennium were changed (Hennesey, 
1981). Gallup and Castelli (1987: 1) call the Second 
Vatican Council "the dominant fact in twentieth-century 
Catholicism." 
There have traditionally been two ways of viewing the 
impact of Vatican II on American Catholics: "One faction 
argues that the Council ruined the Church, and the other 
that it saved the Church from disaster a little later" 
(Hoge, 1986: 291). Within each perspective, I feel, lies 
part of the explanation as to how the Council both 
influenced the development of selective catholicism and 
influenced selective catholics to choose to remain active in 
the Church. 
Vatican II as Damaging the Church 
Exemplifying the former criticism, conservative 
Catholics argued that the sheer number and rapidity of 
changes instituted by the Council angered and alienated 
Catholics, who turned away from the Church as a result 
(Greeley, Mccready and Mccourt, 1976). Another example of 
this viewpoint is Kelley (1972). For Kelley, Vatican II 
modernized and thrust the Church's rituals and customs into 
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the religious mainstream. This for Kelley is the beginning 
of the end for any religion. Thus the Catholic declines in 
the late 1960s and the 1970s are directly attributable to 
the modernizing effects of Vatican II. 
But a slightly modified viewpoint that Vatican II 
damaged the Church contends that the hierarchy's failure to 
follow through with expected reforms of Vatican II spelled 
disaster for the Church (Fichter, 1977; Dulles, 1981; Kim, 
1980; and Osborne, 1969). Vatican II prescribed both 
personal, spiritual reform and structural, institutional 
reform. Osborne (1969) distinguished between these 
different levels of reform by terming them "religious" and 
"ecclesiastical" reform, respectively. "Religious" reform 
refers to change in individuals: in the ways they think and 
behave. "Ecclesiastic" reform is change in the structure of 
the Church. According to Fichter (1977), it was widely 
assumed that the Council's intent was to spark "religious" 
reform by effecting "ecclesiastic" reform. But after the 
Council, the institutional Church facilitated only personal 
"religious" reform. Fichter (1977: 157) states that 
the original expectations [that "religious" and 
"ecclesiastic" reform occur simultaneously] have 
diminished, and the enthusiasm has waned, because the 
promised [structural] adaptation has not occurred, or 
because where it was attempted the pace of change was 
extremely slow. 
After Vatican II catholics found themselves unable "to form 
an image of the church into which they can plausibly fit 
what they think they ought to be doing" (Dulles, 1981: 10). 
Kim (1980) and Osborne (1969) attribute the declines 
in catholic attendance during the 1960s and 1970s to the 
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fact that revolutionary changes in American Catholics' ways 
of thinking and believing were not accompanied by similarly 
revolutionary changes in Church structure. The hierarchical 
structure of the Catholic Church translates into upward 
accountability. Priests are accountable to their bishops 
and not, at least formally, to their parishioners. This 
theoretically allows priests to continue to propagate the 
teachings of the Church hierarchy, regardless of the 
popularity with lay Catholics. 14 And theoretically, lay 
Catholics who disagree could leave (Kim, 1980). Those 
Catholics strongly committed to pluralism as a method of 
operation within the Church left when they found the rigid 
structures of the Church would not facilitate it. 
Although each of these authors recognizes that the 
hierarchy failed to follow through with proposed changes, 
all but Dulles (1981) place too much emphasis on the 
hierarchy's actions after the Council. Vatican II did 
redefine the Church, but it left the door to traditional, 
hierarchical understandings of the Church open. For Dulles 
(1981), the negative reaction to the hierarchy's failure to 
act according to the new definitions is as much a result of 
14Two studies (Greeley, 1973; Leege, 1988) have shown 
that Kim (1980) and Osborne's (1969) understanding of the 
priests' role in Church teaching is incorrect. I address 
these studies in the next chapter. 
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the laity's narrow reading of Vatican II as the hierarchy's 
narrow implementation of it. On one hand, the Council 
defined the Church as the egalitarian "People of God." For 
instance, The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen 
Gentium) states: 
The whole body of the faithful who have an anointing 
that comes from the holy one (cf. 1 Jn. 2:20 and 27) 
cannot err in matters of belief. This characteristic is 
shown in the supernatural appreciation of the faith 
(sensus fidei) of the whole people, when, "from the 
bishops to the last of the faithful" they manifest a 
universal consent in matters of faith and morals. 
(Quoted in Flannery, 1975: 363.) 
There is a clear sense in the above passage that the laity 
share in discerning matters of faith together with the 
hierarchy. It conveys meanings of co-responsibility and 
equality. Furthermore, many other conciliar statements 
endorsed the primacy of lay people's individual consciences 
in forming their beliefs. 
On the other hand, the Council Fathers restate the 
primacy of the hierarchy over the laity in matters of faith 
and morals, and reassert that they "differ essentially and 
not only in degree" (in Flannery, 1975: 361). Another 
example can be found in the same text in which the Council 
stresses collegiality among all the bishops: 
The college or body of bishops has ... no authority 
unless united with the Roman Pontiff, Peter's successor, 
as its head, whose primatial authority, let it be added, 
over all, whether pastors or faithful, remains in its 
integrity. For the Roman Pontiff, by reason of his 
office as Vicar of Christ, namely, and as pastor of the 
entire Church, has full, supreme, and universal power 
over the whole Church, a power which he can always 
exercise unhindered. The order of bishops is the 
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successor to the college of apostles in their role as 
teachers and pastors, and in it the apostolic college is 
perpetuated. Together with their head, the Supreme · 
Pontiff, and never apart from him, they have supreme and 
full authority over the universal Church; but this power 
cannot be exercised without the agreement of the Roman 
Pontiff. (Quoted in Flannery, 1975: 375.) 
This, although more moderate in tone, is more than vaguely 
similar to the 1870 Dogmatic Constitution of Papal 
Infallibility from Vatican I: 
Hence we teach and declare that by appointment of our 
Lord the Roman Church possesses a superiority of 
ordinar1 power over all other Churches, and that this 
power o jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, which is 
truly episcopal is immediate; to which all, of whatever 
rite and dignity, both pastors and faithful, both 
individually and collectively, are bound by their duty 
of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, to 
submit, not only in matters which pertain to faith and 
morals, but also in those that pertain to the discipline 
and government of the Church throughout the world, so 
that the Church of Christ may be one flock under one 
supreme pastor through the preservation of unity both of 
communion and profession of the same faith with the 
Roman Pontiff. This is the teaching of catholic truth, 
from which no one can deviate without loss of faith and 
of salvation. (Quoted in Neuner, Roos, and Rahner, 1967: 
224-225.) 
Dulles (1981) recognizes Vatican II's dual emphasis on a new 
definition of the Church and a redefinition of the 
hierarchical status quo. Dulles feels that progressive lay 
people focused exclusively on the new definitions and 
assumed that everyone else did as well. The hierarchy, on 
the other hand, focused on the old. Eacn faction accused 
the other of misinterpreting and, in Dulles' (1981: 14) 
words "contradicting the Council." The result was a 
polarization and an alienation of many lay Catholics 
resulting in drops in attendance, religious vocations, and 
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acceptance of Church teachings (Dulles, 1981). 
In the absence of structural change, American 
Catholics pursued personal religious renewal. They believed 
that if the Church was not going to meet their expectations, 
they would have to meet their own. Hence the growth of lay 
movements emphasizing personal spirituality (the charismatic 
and Cursillo movements, for example) at the same time many 
catholics were loosening their attachments with the 
institutional Church (Dulles, 1981). 
Vatican II as Mitigating Damage 
A second view of Vatican II's effects contends that 
the Council did not create a crisis but attenuated one. For 
Hoge (1986), the rapid acceptance of Vatican II's emphasis 
on collegiality and consensus occurred because American 
Catholics were waiting for it. He states that the Council 
legitimized and directed changes in the Church, pressure for 
which had been building for many years. Although he does 
not explicitly subscribe to either of the two viewpoints on 
Vatican II's effects stated above, his model of the dam and 
the river seems to convey that Vatican II saved the American 
Church from later disaster. Had it not released the pent-up 
energy, the institutional dam may have burst under the 
pressure of the lay desire for change, resulting in an even 
greater abandonment of the Church. 
Greeley, Mccready and Mccourt (1976) attempted to test 
the effects of Vatican II empirically. For them, the 
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"dominant fact of twentieth-century Catholicism" was not 
Vatican II but the 1968 papal encyclical Humanae Vitae, 
which reaffirmed the Church's disapproval of artificial 
contraception. They found that satisfaction with Vatican II 
slightly mediated the declines in religious devotion which 
correlated with lay rejection of the encyclical. In their 
model, Greeley, Mccready and Mccourt predict that had 
Vatican II not occurred, religious declines after 1968 would 
have been greater. They conclude that Vatican II did not 
contribute to the decline by building up hopes for change. 
catholics' prior use of oral contraceptives would have meant 
rejection of Humanae Vitae and declines in religious 
devotion with or without the Council. Vatican II somewhat 
eased the decline, allowing some Catholics to practice birth 
control while participating in the Church. 
Conclusion 
I suggest that Dulles (1981) and Greeley, Mccready and 
Mccourt (1976) each tell part of the story of Vatican II's 
effect on American Catholics. Dulles emphasizes 
differential interpretations of Vatican II, but Greeley, 
Mccready and McCourt's perspective of the Council's effect 
may be more realistic. Those aspects of Vatican II which 
appealed to the laity, specifically equality with the 
hierarchy and an emphasis on conscience, may have prevented 
more Catholics from leaving. Those who voted with their 
feet may have been the most attached. They could not 
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tolerate a hierarchy which differed from their views of the 
Church. For those less attached, Vatican II may have 
prevented further defections. It offered the American laity 
what they were ready to hear (Hoge, 1986) and 
institutionalized change in the (previously) changeless 
Church (Kim, 1980). Their interpretation of Vatican II 
therefore was enough to counter what many didn't like in the 
Church. That it also strived to maintain the hierarchical 
status quo and that the hierarchy ignored a new emphasis of 
collegiality and quasi-democratic reforms was probably 
irrelevant to less attached lay people. Having joined the 
American culture and placing their religion at the periphery 
of their social lives, it was possible to concentrate on the 
elements with which they agreed and anticipate change of 
those with which they didn't. 
This scenario may represent selective Catholicism's 
beginning. In the social context, American catholics were 
just joining the American mainstream, in which most church 
members were "religious consumers," picking and choosing 
among the items they liked. Catholics picked and chose 
among what Vatican II had to offer. 
This selective attraction to Vatican II itself may 
have reinforced further selective catholicism after the dawn 
of radical individualism in the late 1960s. The laity's 
stress of their equality with the hierarchy and the primacy 
of individual conscience, which they perceived that Vatican 
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II bestowed, may have endorsed an independence from the 
hierarchy in the pursuit of private religion. In other 
words, the laity's interpretation of Vatican II may have led 
them to believe that Catholicism permitted, practically and 
legally, private religions. (The sociological axiom is that 
a situation which is perceived as real is real.) If the 
hierarchy taught otherwise, the laity could retort with 
their understanding of the Council. Individualistic 
believing was the American norm, and had Vatican II not 
facilitated it, even through selective lay interpretation, 
most American Catholics probably would have turned 
elsewhere. 
In brief, "denominationalization," along with other 
social changes, made Catholicism a voluntary organization 
externally. catholicism was perceived as no better than any 
other mainstream religion in America. The internal 
voluntarization originally sparked by Vatican II encouraged 
American Catholics to choose Catholicism over other 
religions, by allowing them to maintain their selective 
method of participating in it. 
THE ROLE OF THE PARISH 
The paradox of selective Catholicism is the laity's 
loyalty, which they express in the form of steady local 
participation in it. This occurs for two reasons. On the 
one hand, catholics encounter tolerant parish priests who 
espouse many of the same attitudes as they. Greeley (1973) 
found that by 1970, 71 percent of active diocesan priests 
rejected the principle that all artificial contraception is 
wrong. This represented an increase of 11 percent since the 
conclusion of the Council in 1965. Meanwhile, the hierarchy 
remained virtually unchanged as only 25 percent dissented in 
1965 and 30 percent in 1970. Leege (1988) found that parish 
priests are as tolerant, and perhaps even more tolerant, 
than lay people of variations in lay behavior and attitudes, 
except for irregular Mass attendance. To put it bluntly, he 
discovered that parish priests generally tolerate selective 
catholicism. 
Leege's (1988) explanation for priests' tolerance lies 
in their location of professional leadership in the parish 
organization. They are trained to teach the Church's 
precepts, but their job is to offer the sacrament of 
forgiveness to all, no matter what precepts are "disobeyed.'' 
From their position, they may believe that those who break 
the Church's precepts are more in need of the Church's 
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forgiveness than those who don't. 
On the other hand, the parishes acted as the medium 
through which Vatican II prevented further withdrawals from 
the Church. They allowed the laity to actively pursue 
democratic and participatory ideals they valued and felt 
Vatican II espoused. Post-Vatican II parishes instituted 
participatory liturgies, parish councils, and a multitude of 
new non-worship programs (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987). 
In fact, the degree to which a parish establishes Vatican II 
reforms is directly related to parishioner participation 
(Cieslak, 1984) 15 and satisfaction (Searle and Leege, 
1985b). The northeastern U.S. dioceses, whose parishes 
institute conciliar reforms less than others, have the 
lowest attendance rates (Roof and McKinney, 1987). 
After Vatican II, most parishes allowed the laity to 
play an active role in their affairs. As a result, the 
Notre Dame Study found that almost half the laity now 
participate in a non-worship activity. Pastors indicated to 
the Notre Dame researchers that lay participation in worship 
and other programs is the key to parish vitality. And 30 
percent of U.S. parishes now employ a lay person as a 
pastoral minister (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987). These 
15cieslak (1984) found that the relationship between 
Vatican II reforms and parishioner participation held for 
small and medium-sized parishes, but was much weaker in 
large parishes. He reasons that large parishes by their 
nature have many programs to appeal to parishioners' various 
tastes, whether or not they directly respond to Vatican II. 
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changes both result from and encourage lay enthusiasm about 
the parish (Cieslak, 1984). 
The conciliar reforms which probably most encouraged 
the laity to remain active in the parish are those affecting 
the Mass. The Notre Dame Study revealed a "liturgical 
smogasboard" (sic.) (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987: 132) 
within U.S. parishes, a pluralism to appeal to different 
tastes. This has encouraged most active Catholics to remain 
in their neighborhood parish rather than seek out an 
alternative. 
Organizational Consequences 
As American catholics were assimilated into mainstream 
American culture, two distinct visions of the Church 
evolved. At the bottom, "Americanized" lay people began to 
favor a more democratic and participatory Church. At the 
top, the hierarchy continued to favor the authoritarian 
structure. Vatican II perpetuated this by simultaneously 
defining the Church as the People of God sharing 
responsibility, and as the hierarchical structure in which 
responsibility and power remain at the top. The laity 
focused on the Council's new definitions of the Church and 
the hierarchy stressed its maintenance of the old. 
The combined effects of selective Catholicism and 
conciliar reforms made these dual visions reality. While 
selective catholicism both results from and signifies 
detachment from the Church, Vatican II's potential for 
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democracy and lay participation prevented many catholics 
from detaching completely. Assimilation, individualism, and 
a selective understanding of Vatican II influenced American 
Catholics to deny the Church's teaching authority in favor 
of individual conscience. But many parishes, through 
participatory liturgies and programs, facilitated their 
post-conciliar visions of the Church. This explains 
selective Catholics' continued participation and loyalty 
despite their rejection of many of the Church's teachings. 
The Church as a social organization, then, has two 
distinct levels. There are now two Catholicisms: (1) the 
institutional Church consisting of the hierarchy, and (2) 
the relatively autonomous parishes consisting of lay people 
who believe and participate selectively. Selective 
Catholics literally don't care about what the Pope and the 
bishops might think or teach (Greeley and Durkin, 1984). 
Their rejection of the hierarchy's teachings severed their 
attachment with the international Church. But they are 
still somewhat attached to the Church at the parish level 
because there they can participate in liturgy, activities, 
and parish administration as they prefer. 
This description of the contemporary Church must, of 
course, be qualified. First, although immigrant Catholics' 
lives centered much more on the parish, there was no gulf 
between the parish and the Church's teaching authority. The 
Catholic Church from the Reformation to the First Vatican 
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Council closely approximated the Weberian ideal-type of 
bureaucracy (Dann, 1976). 16 In the U.S., this bureaucratic 
character probably persisted beyond Vatican I through the 
first half of the twentieth century, as uniformity of belief 
and practice offered protection against the dominant 
culture. 17 Being a Catholic meant "assent" to the will of 
the hierarchy. The laity mostly accepted the beliefs, 
attitudes, and practices the hierarchy prescribed (Dann, 
1976). In the parishes, lay participation was minimal 
(especially in the Latin Mass), pastors controlled the 
administration, and priests generally did not disagree with 
the hierarchy (Greeley, 1973). 
Second, contemporary catholics' "attachment" to the 
parish must be understood within the context of private 
religion. Selective Catholics' participation in the church 
includes little religious interaction with fellow believers. 
If the Church occupies only the limited private sphere, 
there is no need for strong religious community. The 
church's privatized position of non-influence among its 
members' institutional commitments discourages much 
interaction among them. In brief, the importance of 
interacting with fellow members of the institution has no 
16According to Dann (1976), bureaucratic organization is 
actually an aberration within the history of Catholicism. 
Prior to the Reformation, pluralism was more often the rule. 
17This is often one argument used to explain the ideal-
type bureaucratic nature of the Catholic Church in Poland, 
as well as other Eastern Block nations. 
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priority among selective Catholics because the institutional 
church has no strong priority in their lives. 
That active catholics lack strong attachment to their 
parishes became clear from the Notre Dame study. Most 
Catholics have few close friends who belong to the same 
parish but have many friends who are not Catholic 
(Gremillion and Castelli, 1987). This is significant since 
informal association among fellow members encourages 
attachment to a voluntary organization (Lipset, Trow and 
Coleman, 1956). Furthermore, American Catholics have 
infrequent contact with the pastor, and, as I stated in 
Chapter II, feel the parish does not meet many of their 
"social needs" (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987). As for 
participation in the Mass, Searle and Leege (1985b: 6) 
conclude that 
the liturgy does a reasonably good job of providing most 
Catholics with a recognizable place of encounter with 
God, even if it is not always clear that it is an 
encounter with God shared corporately, i.e. in the body 
of the church. 
In another study, utendorf (1985) discovered that primary 
motivations for attending lay ministry training programs are 
individualistic in nature. Dixon and Hoge (1979) discovered 
that suburban lay people ranked individualistic needs 
(education and counseling) as the highest priorities of the 
parish. Their top communal priority ranked fifth out of 
twenty-one. Finally, the parish structure itself may lead 
to weak attachment, since "as parishes offer more programs, 
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parish life tends to become more fragmented" (Gremillion and 
Castelli, 1987: 70). 
To complete the circle, the selective nature of 
believing, which in part results from institutional 
detachment, itself further discourages interaction. As Roof 
and McKinney (1987: 56) state, 
one could say that the enemy of church life in this 
country is not so much "secularity" as it is "do-it-
yourself religiosity." The latter fosters a highly 
personalized mode of faith which undercuts the 
integrality of the church and synagogue. 
"Do-it-yourself religiosity," or selective Catholicism, 
denies a commonality of belief among believers. With 
individuals forging their own faiths, there is little in 
common to share. Selective Catholicism, then, represents 
religious individualism not only in the selecting of church 
teachings to follow, but in the lack of interaction among 
its members. 
In brief, actively participating in a parish no longer 
implies strong attachment to the Church. It therefore does 
not indicate uniform acceptance of the hierarchy's 
teachings. The laity's participation today differs from 
their participation in the immigrant Church. Most parishes 
no longer serve as a communications medium for the 
hierarchy. They serve, rather, primarily as a medium for 
instituting the changes of Vatican II and for the laity's 
pursuit of selective Catholicism. Participation in the 
parish may be solid, but the laity participate because they 
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choose to (it appeals to them) and on condition that 
ultimate authority rests with the individual. The hierarchy 
today, unlike in the immigrant Church, is by and large 
separated from the parish. In this context, selective 
Catholics' participation and loyalty to the Church does not 
seem so much a paradox. As Greeley (1977: 128) states, it 
is a loyalty "transformed" from that of their grandparents. 
The Future of the Catholic Organization 
A question which lingers is whether this 
organizational scheme will survive in light of recent 
Vatican "crackdowns" on theological, moral, and 
administrative "unorthodoxy." Can the hierarchy re-make the 
parish into its medium? Because the question concerns the 
Church as an organization, the answer lies as much in the 
sociology of voluntary organizations as in secularization 
and culture theory. 
A classic work in that field which may shed light on 
the question is Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956). Their 
subject was the International Typographical Union (ITU), a 
labor union whose locals at the bottom were relatively 
autonomous from the central administration at top. Most 
labor unions, generally, manifest Robert Michels' "Iron Law 
of Oligarchy," formally espousing democratic processes but 
actually experiencing almost total rule by a few long-term 
leaders. The ITU, however, institutionalized a two-party, 
democratic system of rule. No party or group of leaders 
held power for a substantial period of time, often because 
of opposition from the locals. 
My characterization of the Church resembles the ITU. 
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In both, the local organizations stand relatively autonomous 
from the central administration. Now, there are 
considerable differences between the Catholic Church and the 
ITU. Most obviously, the Church never was democratic and 
its structure of sacramental ministry may not permit 
democracy in the future. Furthermore, ITU members associate 
with each other more frequently both formally and informally 
than American Catholics, thus having a greater interest in 
the union's administration than Catholics have in the 
Church's. But a comparative analysis of the two 
organizations is possible in asmuchas Lipset, Trow, and 
Coleman studied reasons for the lack of oligarchy as well as 
the presence of democracy in the ITU. The common reference 
points are the characteristics shared by each which resist 
oligarchy. Only after determining by this comparison which 
factors led to the decline of the Church's oligarchical 
influence, can we turn to the question of the Church's 
organizational future. 
Absence of Oligarchy in the ITU 
Most labor unions, according to Lipset, Trow and 
Coleman, were organized by a few leaders who were able to 
maintain oligarchy after the unions' founding. The entities 
further down the organization are kept subordinate to the 
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central administration. The ITU was literally built "from 
the bottom up." Its origin as a federation of smaller 
printers' groups prevented the development of oligarchy at 
the outset. Throughout its history, the local organizations 
have not subordinated their power to the central 
administration. 
Much of the reason for oligarchy's continued absence 
in the ITU is the status of the printing occupation, both in 
terms of socioeconomic position and occupational authority. 
From its inception in the late Middle Ages, the printing 
occupation identified itself as a skilled craft, and in 
modern society as a profession. Those who do perceive 
themselves as working-class consider printing as the "most 
intellectual of the manual trades" (Lipset, Trow and 
Coleman, 1956: 26). Printers also enjoy a great deal of 
freedom from the authority of both shop and union managers. 
They are free to conduct themselves in the shop as they see 
fit. The status of the printing trade overall creates a 
narrow status gap between union leaders and the rank and 
file. As a result, rank and file members do not perceive 
much of a difference between themselves and the leadership, 
and the leaders lack a status motivation to retain their 
positions. For Lipset, Trow and Coleman, equality of 
members and leaders discourages oligarchy. 
ITU members engage in a number of activities with 
other printers, mostly leisure in nature, which are not 
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directly related to union activities. The significance of 
these "secondary organizations" is their autonomy from the 
union adminstration, their ability to arouse members' 
interest in the union's political arena independently of the 
union leadership, and their ability to training rank and 
file members in the art of leadership. The high degree of 
member interest which results prevents the union from being 
able to establish oligarchy. A highly involved ITU rank and 
file stands as an obstacle to the leaders' effectively 
establishing an oligarchy. Thus, For Lipset, Trow and 
Coleman, the members' involvement in secondary activities 
prevents oligarchy. 
The Laity's Similarities with the ITU Printers 
Three of the characteristics of the printer's 
community which Lipset, Trow and Coleman attribute to 
discouraging oligarchy in the ITU exist among the Catholic 
laity. 
Like the ITU, the parishes literally have been built, 
or more properly rebuilt, "from the ground up." The laity 
have voluntarily established many of the programs in the 
parish. And their newfound participation in worship and 
parish governance has significantly shaped those areas. 
Thus the autonomy of the parish was very much the laity's 
doing. Because of the parish's autonomy the hierarchy has 
little power over the laity. The question to address is 
whether this diminished power of the hierarchy can be 
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sustained as the absence of oligarchy has been sustained in 
the ITU. The answer, based on Lipset, Trow and Coleman's 
analysis, is yes. 
Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) asserted that equality 
between members and leaders of a voluntary organization 
discourages oligarchy. The status gap between the laity and 
the hierarchy has narrowed in a number of ways. American 
Catholics' socioeconomic status has increased during the 
twentieth century. A significant aspect of their upward 
mobility has been their attainments of higher levels of 
education. The educated laity now perceive themselves as 
competent to rely on their own religious judgments. Another 
aspect of that mobility has been an increase in managerial 
and professional, or "self-directed" occupations. Vatican 
II also played a role in narrowing the status gap, by 
declaring in many instances that the laity, the clergy, and 
the hierarchy were equal. In brief, the hierarchy cannot 
effectively regain its position of influence over American 
Catholics' beliefs and behaviors because they cannot prove 
their superiority over lay individuals' own judgments. 
Furthermore, American Catholics' participation in 
parish activities is similar to ITU members' participation 
in "secondary organizations" independent of the union. Most 
parish organizations exist with no reference to the 
institutional Church in Rome. Some, such as organizations 
for homosexual Catholics, even exist against the Vatican's 
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wishes. By participating in these activities, Lipset, Trow 
and Coleman would argue, the laity's interest in the Church 
rises. Although that interest cannot manifest itself in 
voting, as in the ITU, this heightened interest might 
pressure the hierarchy to back down and accept the laity's 
definition of how the Church is to exist. For instance, 
Gallup and Castelli (1987: 177-178) assert that the American 
bishops have "tolerated widespread internal dissent as a 
means of keeping the Church intact" and that "by the sheer 
numbers in which they have adopted this style of loyal 
opposition, [the laity] have forced the American bishops to 
accept their new definitions of Catholicism." The hierarchy 
in the Vatican can try to reaffirm its definitions and 
methods of operating the Church. But the laity, according 
to this analysis, are unlikely to yield. Thus, the Roman 
hierarchy may be faced with having to permanently accept the 
laity's ways of doing things, or losing considerable numbers 
of lay Catholics for whom choosing a new church will not be 
a practical or personal dilemma. 
CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The purpose of this paper has been to examine a new 
way of conceptualizing the catholic Church in the United 
States. The selective Catholicism concept suggests that, as 
a result of many different changes in the twentieth century, 
American Catholics ignore the Church's teaching authority 
despite participating in its local "branches,'' namely the 
parishes. I emphasized in the introduction that it was a 
concept which had received only cursory attention, being 
mentioned almost as an aside in many discussions of American 
Catholics. I examined the definitions of selective 
Catholicism, as gleaned from the literature, and spent the 
bulk of my discussion analyzing its causes and its effects 
on the Catholic organization. 
Recent surveys of American Catholics empirically 
indicate the existence of selective Catholicism. Both 
active and inactive Catholics often differ with the 
teachings of the hierarchy. When individual beliefs do 
conform with hierarchical prescriptions, it is because 
individual judgments allow them to, not because of any sense 
of obedience. These surveys also demonstrate that Mass 
attendance rates are recovering from the declines of the 
1960s and 1970s, which suggests that differences of opinion 
with the hierarchy no longer cause Catholics to leave the 
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Church. Both social and ecclesiastical changes have caused 
catholics to ignore the hierarchy while still participating 
actively in the Church at the local level. 
The literature dealing with American Catholics 
suggests that a primary cause of selective Catholicism has 
been the assimilation of American lay people into the 
dominant culture. One specific effect of that assimilation 
has been the laity's exposure to the cultural forces of 
privatized religion and radical individualism. This was a 
dominant factor in distancing American catholics from the 
Church. Empirical research, especially the Notre Dame 
study, has demonstrated that contemporary American Catholics 
indeed practice private religion. 
At the same time, voluntarizing changes within the 
Church not only encouraged Catholics to choose Catholicism 
as their religion, but allowed them to practice selective 
catholicism. Vatican II facilitated a new understanding of 
the Church as internally legitimizing selective Catholicism, 
and it also allowed for more participatory and democratic 
lay involvement in the local parishes. As a result, the 
Church now consists of two distinct levels: the hierarchical 
institution and the local parishes. 
Finally, I have predicted that selective Catholicism 
will continue into the future, even if the hierarchy insists 
on reasserting the teaching authority it enjoyed in the 
immigrant Church. In the event the hierarchy succeeds in 
doing this, selective Catholicism will cease only because 
selective catholics will join some other religion. 
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In light of my assertion that this concept has 
received inadequate attention, the task is now to propose 
future study of the concept as well as my arguments 
surrounding it. The next step is empirical investigation of 
selective catholicism and the hypotheses implied in this 
paper. Regarding the former, I suggest the task for 
sociologists of religion is to survey lay Catholics to 
determine the patterns of selective Catholicism. Regarding 
the latter, I suggest the task is to observe the causal line 
of events which I've hypothesized lead to selective 
Catholicism. 
Types of Selective catholicism 
A dominant theme in the literature about American 
Catholics is that they are a heterogeneous population about 
whom universal generalizations are difficult to establish. 
This paper has attempted to do precisely that. In such an 
introduction to a concept, a detailed analysis of variations 
of selective Catholicism has not been possible. The 
questions of detail remain, however. For example, is there 
a "scale" of selective Catholicism, a continuum from low to 
high, on which to place Catholics? The Notre Dame study 
found that Catholics felt there were some topics which the 
hierarchy could legitimately address, such as international 
poverty. They did not grant the hierarchy such legitimacy 
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to speak on other areas closer to individual behavior, such 
as sexuality issues. I have suggested that this makes 
little difference, since in the context of privatized 
religion ultimate authority lies with the individual. But 
this remains to be proven. Are there some areas of moral 
discourse in which the laity are more likely to accept the 
hierarchy's teachings on the basis of their authority. More 
to the point, which Catholics are more likely to accept 
which teachings of the hierarchy, if any, on the basis of 
its authority? 
An interesting element of that investigation will be 
the variance according to parish. The Notre Dame studies 
revealed that "there is more consensus within parish than 
within demographic groupings" (Leege, 1987a: 3). Since 
selective catholics participate heavily in the parishes, it 
would be revealing to see what kinds of parish might contain 
different degrees of selective Catholicism. From there, 
more complex theorizing as to the relationship between lay 
Catholics and their parishes would be possible. 
The goal of this investigation would be a model of the 
Church's lower component, the collection of parishes, 
according to the style of selective Catholicism. Dann 
(1976; 1978) proposed a model of "belonging" which placed 
Catholics within a matrix according to their mode of 
relating to and interacting with the Church. A model based 
on selective Catholicism could be constructed if certain 
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patterns of selective behavior were discovered. Dann's 
model allowed for infinite variations in belonging, 
according to an individual's ranking on the various 
criteria. A selective catholicism model of the Church would 
have to allow the same thing, since the concept in question 
is a form of individualism. 
Testing the Causal Line: Hispanics 
This paper has proposed a causal explanation for the 
development of selective Catholicism. Many changes among 
American Catholics directly and indirectly, through 
institutional detachment, led to its development. As 
American Catholics experienced socioeconomic and demographic 
changes, their need for the Church as a protector 
diminished. Their attachments to the Church therefore 
diminished, making them less likely to feel obligated to 
obey the Church's teaching authority. These changes also 
thrust them into the mainstream American culture, in which 
religion was privatized. As Catholics "became American," 
they too privatized their religion, limiting its influence 
to a private sphere of their social circles. From that 
sphere, the hierarchy could not influence the rest of their 
lives. And as a further consequence, American catholics 
became "religious consumers." The radical individualism 
which started in the late 1960s, reinforced their 
consumerist behavior, further distancing their decision-
making from the influence of the hierarchy. What has kept 
them involved in the Church has been the parishes; 
adaptation to certain reforms of Vatican II, as well as 
parish priests' tolerance for selective catholicism. 
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In order to test this hypothesis, the social scientist 
would have to devise a way to test the effects of these 
social changes on a group of Catholics. The problem is that 
for most Catholics, these changes have already occurred. 
One could compare empirical analyses from earlier in the 
century with those of today. But a more beneficial 
alternative would be to observe a group of immigrant 
Catholics over time as they "become American," and 
experience the same social forces as previous immigrant 
groups. Fortunately such a group may exist in the Hispanic 
population. 
Unfortunately, this suggestion may not be as simple as 
it appears on the surface. For one thing, Gallup and 
Castelli (1987: 142) found that in many ways Hispanic 
Catholics have "curiously loose institutional attachments." 
The researcher needs to determine why that is so. Is it a 
result of a poor response by the American Church to their 
needs? If so, it may be only a matter of time before the 
Church responds adequately to increase their attachments. 
Time is one luxury the researcher may have, as the influx of 
Hispanic immigrants does not appear to end any time soon. 
Furthermore, the process of assimilation among 
Hispanics may not occur as rapidly or in the same manner as 
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it did for European immigrants. The American economy of 
today is vastly different than that of the first half of the 
century. European immigrant generations had the benefit of 
industrial jobs to propel their socioeconomic mobility. The 
dual-level economy of today offers unskilled immigrants low-
paying service employment, which may not facilitate such 
mobility. It may be that Hispanics could become a permanent 
"underclass." 
However, the potential of a "living laboratory" to 
study the hypotheses which the Hispanic population offers 
makes such a time series study worth pursuing. 
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